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1957] RECENT DECISIONS 597 
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-VENUE-SITUS OF CRIME OF FAILING TO 
PERFORM STATUTORY DuTY-Three defendants, classified conscientious ob-
jectors, were prosecuted for violations of the Military Training and Service 
Act.1 Defendants were ordered to report to their local boards for civilian 
work assignments in lieu of induction. They reported to their boards but 
refused to comply with instructions ordering them to report at hospitals 
located in judicial districts other than those of their boards. The Third 
Circuit held that the crime of "knowingly failing or neglecting to obey any 
such order"2 was committed in the district where the hospital was located 
and that venue was proper in such district.3 On similar facts the Tenth 
Circuit had previously held that the crime was committed in the district 
where the draft board was located and venue was improper in any other 
district.4 On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, Third 
Circuit affirmed, three justices dissenting. Defendants were required to 
report to the local board and to report for employment. The crime arises 
from a failure to complete the second duty, and the place fixed for its per-
formance fixes the situs of the crime and determines the venue of the 
offense. Johnston v. United States, 351 U.S. 215 (1956). 
The accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to a jury trial 
"in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed."5 The basic 
question therefore is one of statutory interpretation as to where one who 
"knowingly fails or neglects to obey"0 the order of his local board has 
committed the offense. The answer would seem clear if defendants had 
proceeded to the hospitals and refused to work. Venue would then be in 
1 62 Stat. 604 to 627 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §§451 to 470. 
2 62 Stat. 609 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. (1952) §456 (j). 
3 United States v. Johnston, (3d Cir. 1955) 227 F. (2d) 745. 
4 United States v. Patteson, (10th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 257. 
5 U. S. CONST., art. III, §2; Amend. VI. 
6 Note 2 supra. 
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the federal district court where the hospital was located.1 Similarly, if de-
fendants had refused to report to their local boards venue would be proper 
only in the districts of the local boards.8 But where defendants reported 
to their local boards and then refused to perform the duty of reporting to 
their places of assignment, the answer is less clear. In such cases venue is 
usually determined by the general rule that the place established for the 
performance of the duty fixes the situs of the crime,0 as is the rule in state 
non-support cases.10 The holding in the instant case fixes venue where the 
duty was to be performed. Under a contrary view, a difficult problem could 
arise if defendants started to their places of assignment and in route decided 
not to report. If they had traveled through several judicial districts the 
place of commission of the crime (i.e., refusal to report) might be im-
·possible to determine, and prosecution of offenders would be seriously im-
peded.11 Also, if prosecutions can be brought in distant areas, defendants, 
because of inconvenience, distance, and expense, may be deprived of wit-
nesses. Even if this were not true, defendants might be denied the benefit 
of the jury's knowledge of the reputations of witnesses testifying in their 
favor.12 On the facts of the principal case, however, the frequency and ex-
tent of such inconvenience and unfairness is questionable,13 and the prob-
lem has gained but scant recognition in other cases where the crime has 
consisted of a failure to perform a duty in a distant location.14 Considera-
7United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699 (1946); Gibson v. United States, 329 U.S. 
338 (1946). 
s Humes v. Pescor, (8th Cir. 1945) 148 F. (2d) 127; Jones v. Pescor, (8th Cir. 1948) 
169 F. (2d) 853; United States v. Van Den Berg, (7th Cir. 1944) 139 F. (2d) 654. 
9 Accord: United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73 (1916); Rumely v. McCarthy, 250 
U.S. 283 (1919); Bratton v. United States, (10th Cir. 1934) 73 F. (2d) 795; United States 
v. Commerford, (2d Cir. 1933) 64 F. (2d) 28; Yarborough v. United States, (4th Cir. 
1956) 230 F, (2d) 56; New York Cent. &: H. R.R. Co. v. United States, (2d Cir. 1908) 166 
F. 267; United States v. Sutter, (S.D. Cal. 1954) 127 F. Supp. 109. See United States v. 
Anderson, note 7 supra, at 704-705. 
10 See cases cited in 6 STAN. L. REv. 709 at 710-711 (1954). 
11 See State v. Jackson, 187 Ind. 694 at 699, 121 N.E. 114 (1918). It further appears 
that the crime is not committed until the date for reporting has passed, since there is 
no specific duty to proceed at any time or place. This contrasts with the procedure 
during World War II whereby conscientious objectors and inductees were delivered by 
the government to places of assignment and induction. S.S. Regs. 652.1 to 652.13, 653.11 
to 653.12, 651.2 to 651.10. This indicates that while proceeding under government direction 
was formerly a duty distinct from the obligation to report to the local board and place 
of assignment, such a duty does not exist today with reference to conscientious objectors. 
This argument clearly supports the majority opinion, i.e., that a refusal to report to 
the place of assignment, not a refusal to travel, is the essence of the duty which is violated. 
12 United States v. Johnson, 323 U.S. 273 at 276 (1944): " ..• [I]f an enactment of 
Congress equally permits the underlying spirit of the constitutional concern for [jury] 
trial in the vicinage to be respected • . . construction should go in the direction of 
the constitutional policy even though not commanded by it.'' See Connor, "The Con-
stitutional Right to a Trial by Jury of the Vicinage," 57 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 197 (1909). 
13 See Brief for United States in Supreme Court for principal case at 53-54 to the 
effect that conscientious objectors are not ordered out of the United States against their 
will and are not usually ordered to leave their own state. 
14 See note 9 supra. 
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tions of convenience to the prosecution and fairness to the defendant in these 
cases could be effectively resolved by permitting a transfer to the place of 
refusal upon defendant's motion showing a greater convenience to the 
witnesses, parties and the court.15 It is within the power of the Supreme 
Court to prescribe such a change in the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
cedure.16 Particularly in light of the strong opinion of the dissenting 
members of the Court, it would seem that such a change in federal pro-
cedure would provide a definitive situs of the crime, and would at the same 
time remove the serious possibility of infringement of defendant's right to 
a fair jury trial. 
John C. Baity 
15 See Blume, "The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Vicinage and Venue," 43 MICH. 
L. R.Ev. 59 (1944). 
1618 u.s.c. (1952) §3771. 
